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COMMENT
NOT SECURE IN THEIR PERSONS: BRIDGING
GARNER AND GRAHAM
Eric Szkarlat*
INTRODUCTION
Black and brown families across America know “the talk.”1 Parents of
color warn their children about inevitable police encounters, which too often
turn deadly2 even when citizens of color comply with police orders.3 But
nonfatal force often does not appear reasonable either: when a nine-year-old
Black girl failed to comply with orders,4 the police officer pepper sprayed
her and said, “You did it to yourself.”5
What in the law justifies the use of such force? As this Essay
demonstrates, existing case law permits it.6 Even U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Sotomayor noted the Court’s reticence to offer basic protection from
excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.7 Such deference to police
officers’ split-second decisions is acutely dangerous; in 2015 alone, police

* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. & B.T.A., 2013, University
of Michigan. Thank you to my late professor William “Buzz” Alexander for making space
for me and so many others to confront racism in criminal law, and thanks to the staff of the
Fordham Law Review for this bold project.
1. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
2. See German Lopez, Black Parents Describe “The Talk” They Give to Their Children
About Police, VOX (Aug. 8, 2016, 11:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016/8/8/12401792/
police-black-parents-the-talk [https://perma.cc/R84K-EG7A].
3. See, e.g., Mitch Smith, Video of Police Killing of Philando Castile Is Publicly
Released, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/us/policeshooting-castile-trial-video.html [https://perma.cc/4L6E-WJNT].
4. Deepti Hajela & Lindsay Whitehurst, ‘I Am a Child!’: Pepper Spray Reflects Policing
of Black Kids, AP NEWS (Feb. 12, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/policing-black-kids6708e9f229ed9d28b9c60a41ea988b59 [https://perma.cc/9VAJ-KV9K].
5. Janelle Griffith, ‘You Did It to Yourself,’ Officer Tells 9-Year-Old Girl PepperSprayed by Police in Newly Released Video, NBC NEWS (Feb. 12, 2021, 3:41 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/you-did-it-yourself-officer-tells-9-year-old-girln1257630 [https://perma.cc/LWC2-9LMM].
6. See Alice Ristroph, The Constitution of Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1182, 1189
(2017).
7. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 26 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“By sanctioning
a ‘shoot first, think later’ approach to policing, the Court renders the protections of the Fourth
Amendment hollow.”).
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killed an estimated 1240 civilians.8 Further, excessive force has a disparate
racial impact.9
However, a recent shift in the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence emphasized personal security enumerated as a positive right in
the amendment’s guarantee “to be secure in their persons.”10 This Essay
explores the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment and applies it to
excessive force cases. Part I reviews the Fourth Amendment’s text and its
application in excessive force cases. Part II examines the substantive
elements the Court considered in Tennessee v. Garner11 and their absence in
the later cases Graham v. Connor12 and Scott v. Harris.13 Part III synthesizes
the Graham balancing test with the Fourth Amendment’s original meaning
to reinterpret and revitalize the substantive elements of the Garner analysis.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF GRAHAM
The Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of
constitutional protection against police use of excessive force in arrests.14
Most Fourth Amendment jurisprudence centers on what is “reasonable.”15
Perhaps courts focus on reasonableness because it defines what kinds of
government searches and seizures courts will permit. But key text also
establishes a personal security right.16 Part I.A begins by examining that text
and the right to personal security. Part I.B discusses the three major cases
governing police use of force in arrests.
A. Force and the Fourth Amendment
Policing agencies organize force on a continuum17 that authorizes greater
force as a suspect resists arrest.18 Suspects generally must comply with
police orders or else experience greater force.19 Because of this escalating
8. Carl Bialik, A New Estimate of Killings by Police Is Way Higher—And Still Too Low,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 6, 2015, 4:07 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/a-newestimate-of-killings-by-police-is-way-higher-and-still-too-low/
[https://perma.cc/W2J6XN4E] (extrapolating reported data to include nonreporting agencies and estimating 1240
people killed by police). The United States surpasses its international democratic counterparts
in police violence. Evelyn Michalos, Note, Time over Matter: Measuring the Reasonableness
of Officer Conduct in § 1983 Claims, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1033 (2020).
9. Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV.
211, 288 (2017).
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Torres v. Madrid, No. 19-292, slip op. at 17 (U.S. Mar.
25, 2021).
11. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
12. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
13. 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
14. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
15. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“[T]he ultimate
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness’ . . . .”).
16. See Torres v. Madrid, No. 19-292, slip op. at 17 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2021).
17. When evaluating force, courts generally defer to a police officer’s discretion. See
Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 9, at 223, 269–70.
18. Ristroph, supra note 6, at 1185–86.
19. Id.
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force continuum, excessive force cases typically involve significant bodily
injury and death.20 Yet existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence scantly
protects against injury and death in forcible arrests. In fact, courts reviewing
excessive force cases rarely focus on the scope of the positive rights the
Fourth Amendment affords.21 Further, remedies for Fourth Amendment
violations tend to be weak or unavailable in excessive force cases.22
From the Fourth Amendment language articulating “the right of the people
to be secure in their persons,”23 the Supreme Court recently revived the
Fourth Amendment interest in “personal security” in the excessive force
context when it decided Torres v. Madrid.24 Earlier decisions discussed
personal security,25 but later cases retreated from the term.26 One sitting
justice dissented from the majority opinion in Torres and characterized
personal security as “penumbral” to the Fourth Amendment.27 However, the
majority rebutted this notion, saying that personal security is anything but
penumbral: it is textual.28
Case discussions of “personal security” often relate to common law.29
William Blackstone defined the individual right to “personal security” as “a
person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of” life, limbs, body, health, and
reputation.30 He noted that the threat of losing one’s “life, or . . . limbs, in
case of [one’s] non-compliance” voids otherwise legally executed acts.31
His contemporaries who drafted the ratified Fourth Amendment almost
certainly knew of this terminology.32 Because virtually all modern police
use of force to effectuate an arrest carries the possibility for serious injury to
20. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 390 (1989) (involving bruising, lacerations, and
broken bones); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985) (involving the death of a young boy
suspected of burglary who fled from police).
21. See Luke M. Milligan, The Forgotten Right to Be Secure, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 713, 717–
18 (2014); see also Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV.
1181, 1264 (2016) (noting that the right to be secure is a positive right).
22. See Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development of the Law: A
Comment on Camreta v. Greene and Davis v. United States, 2010–2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
237, 239–44 (discussing the relative weakness of four Fourth Amendment remedies).
23. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
24. See Torres v. Madrid, No. 19-292, slip op. at 17 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2021).
25. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1968) (recognizing an “inestimable right to personal
security”).
26. One case relegated “personal security” to footnotes of the dissenting opinion. See
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 637 n.12, 646 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (1991).
27. Torres, slip op. at 24, 26 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 17 (majority opinion).
29. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (quoting a common law tort case, Union Pac. Ry. Co.
v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
30. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129.
31. Id. at *130 (emphasis added).
32. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV.
547, 679–80 n.363 (1999). The final amendment differed significantly from earlier versions.
Compare Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fourth Amendment, 114 POL. SCI. Q. 79, 96 (1999)
(“[T]he Citizens shall not be exposed to unreasonable searches, seizures of their papers,
houses, persons, or property.”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting an early draft),
with U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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“life” and “limb” as a result of noncompliance,33 all excessive force cases
implicate the individual’s Fourth Amendment interest in personal security.
B. Excessive Force at the Supreme Court
Three cases represent the Supreme Court’s current excessive force
jurisprudence. This section discusses those cases in chronological order:
first Garner, then Graham, and finally Scott.
1. Tennessee v. Garner
Police suspected that Edward Garner, an unarmed Black fifteen-year-old,
committed burglary.34 To seize him, an officer shot Garner in the head as he
ran away, killing Garner.35 Ten dollars and a purse were found on Garner’s
person.36 His family sued the Memphis, Tennessee Police Department and
brought claims under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.37
The Supreme Court applied the conventional Fourth Amendment
balancing test, which weighs the government’s interests in effectuating the
seizure against the intrusion the seizure placed on Garner.38 Noting that the
“intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly force is unmatched,”39 the
Court elaborated that deadly force “frustrates” the individual’s interests in
due process and fair punishment.40 Thus, the Court held that officers may
not use deadly force to effectuate an arrest unless they have probable cause
to believe that the person poses a significant threat of death or serious injury
either to the officer or to others.41
Scholars typically understand Garner to represent a bright-line rule in
cases where officers use deadly force.42 But it laid the groundwork for more
permissive cases when it hinted, but did not hold, that the courts should
review all excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment.43 Justice
Byron White’s analysis suggested that due process, protected at the state
level by the Fourteenth Amendment,44 was somehow within the rights
protected by the Fourth Amendment.45 Perhaps more problematically for

33. See Ristroph, supra note 6, at 1212.
34. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3, 4 n.2 (1985); see also Kevin P. Jenkins, Police
Use of Deadly Force Against Minorities: Ways to Stop the Killing, 9 HARV. BLACKLETTER J.
1, 6 (1992).
35. Garner, 471 U.S. at 3–4.
36. Id. at 4.
37. Id. at 5.
38. Id. at 7–8.
39. Id. at 9.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 11.
42. See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
1119, 1128 (2008).
43. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
45. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 13.
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later courts,46 Garner expressly abrogated the common law rule permitting
deadly force in felony arrests by noting that technological advances cast
doubt upon that rule.47
2. Graham v. Connor
When Dethorne Graham, a diabetic Black man, experienced an insulin
reaction, a friend drove him to a convenience store to purchase orange
juice.48 Upon entering, Graham saw that the store had a long checkout line,
so he decided not to wait.49 The police officer, Connor, became suspicious
when he witnessed Graham enter and quickly leave the store.50 He arrested
Graham, who pled with officers to check his diabetic card.51 Officers told
him to “shut up” and threw him headfirst into the police car.52 Graham
suffered a broken foot, wrist lacerations, forehead bruises, and a shoulder
injury; he also complained of a persistent loud ringing in his right ear.53
Graham brought a § 1983 claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.54
In a landmark case, the Supreme Court declared that the proper test to
apply to any excessive force claim—deadly or not—was the Fourth
Amendment objective reasonableness test.55 The Court rejected Graham’s
Fourteenth Amendment claim, holding that substantive due process is
inapplicable because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual
source controlling officer conduct.56 Reasoning that officers must make
split-second decisions, the Court ruled that an officer’s use of force cannot
be evaluated with “the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”57 The decision also
enumerated three factors for courts to weigh in excessive force cases: (1) the
severity of the crime alleged; (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate
threat to anyone’s safety; and (3) whether the suspect is resisting arrest or
attempting to flee.58 Despite heavy criticism,59 Graham continues to control
in excessive force cases.

46. See infra notes 79–86 and accompanying text.
47. Garner, 471 U.S. at 13.
48. Graham, 490 U.S. at 388; Charles Lane, Opinion, A 1989 Supreme Court Ruling Is
Unintentionally Providing Cover for Police Brutality, WASH. POST (June 8, 2020, 6:57 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-1989-supreme-court-ruling-is-unintentionallyproviding-cover-for-police-brutality/2020/06/08/91cc7b0c-a9a7-11ea-94d2d7bc43b26bf9_story.html [https://perma.cc/WP4Q-P2UX].
49. Graham, 490 U.S. at 389.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 390.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 392.
56. Id. at 395.
57. Id. at 396.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 42, at 1129–40 (criticizing the Graham factors and their
application in subsequent cases).
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3. Scott v. Harris
In 2007, the Court had the opportunity to apply Graham again. While
driving on a highway, Black nineteen-year-old Victor Harris exceeded the
speed limit by eighteen miles per hour.60 Officers, including Deputy
Timothy Scott, began pursuing him.61 Harris increased his speed to elude
capture.62 To terminate the chase, Scott crashed his own bumper into
Harris’s car.63 The crash left Harris with quadriplegia.64
Surprisingly, the majority opinion in Scott cited the seemingly on-point
Graham decision only twice.65 Justice Antonin Scalia spent most of the
decision criticizing Garner.66 He configured Garner as an application of the
later-decided Graham.67 He reasoned that the question of whether Scott used
deadly force was irrelevant,68 suggesting that Garner may not constitute a
bright-line test after all.69 Justice Scalia also argued that the danger present
to pedestrians and other motorists justified the government’s intrusion on
Harris, so Scott’s use of force was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.70 Blurring the lines between deadly and nondeadly force, Scott
weakened Garner’s holding.
II. THE IMBALANCE IN THE FORCE TEST
Garner represents the last major case in which the Supreme Court applied
a balancing test which seriously discussed any individual interests to
excessive force claims.71 Because textualists have reacted to the Garner
holding’s mixed approach72 with some disapproval, current excessive force
doctrine fails to afford individual Fourth Amendment interests adequate
weight. Thus, Graham predominates, but applying its test has failed to
account for personal security. Part II.A revisits Garner to better understand
what individual Fourth Amendment interests the Court weighed. Part II.B
examines how the Court’s refusal to consider those interests led to
imbalanced decisions in Graham and Scott.

60. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374 (2007).
61. Id. at 374–75.
62. Harris later said he ran because he feared going to jail for driving on a suspended
license. See Why I Ran: Christie/Victor (A&E television broadcast Oct. 12, 2008)
(interviewing Victor Harris).
63. Scott, 550 U.S. at 375.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 381–82.
66. Id. at 381–83.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 383.
69. See Harmon, supra note 42, at 1135–37.
70. Scott, 550 U.S. at 383–84.
71. Torres did not reach the balancing test, ruling only that an application of physical
force with intent to restrain is a Fourth Amendment seizure. See Torres v. Madrid, No. 19292, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2021).
72. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.

146

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 89

A. Which Amendment in Garner?
The Garner decision’s evocation of constitutional rights enumerated in
other amendments might have led subsequent decisions to emphasize Fourth
Amendment interests.73 The Garner Court called a person’s life an
“unmatched” interest.74 It further analyzed the individual and societal
interests in due process and meaningful punishment.75 The Garner approach
seemed in tune with the Fourteenth Amendment, while Graham and Scott
more heavily emphasized the government’s interests under the Fourth
Amendment.76
Yet Garner also couched its analysis squarely within the Fourth
Amendment.77 The Court did not stray into questions of unfairness, for
example, which would draw originalist ire.78 Rather, the decision’s attention
appeared to focus de facto on personal security from unreasonable seizure.79
Killing Garner for having $10 and a purse on him was unreasonable because
his personal security interest—his life—outweighed any government
interest.80 Thus, while the Court’s analysis was not grounded in
constitutional text, it could have been: the Court could have emphasized the
first part of the Fourth Amendment.81 By failing to do so, the Garner Court
set into motion several decades of permissive Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence which have given police a blank check for brutality.82
B. The Graham Imbalance
In contrast to Garner, the Graham test weighs strikingly few individual
interests. Graham outlined the conventional Fourth Amendment test83 that
balances the government’s interest in executing the search or seizure against
its intrusiveness on the individual’s interests.84 In the context of arrests,
courts consider the individual interests that the Fourth Amendment
protects.85 Thus, considerations of procedural and substantive due process,
as well as cruel and unusual punishment, are inapposite.86

73. See supra notes 55, 65–69 and accompanying text.
74. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985).
75. Id.
76. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396
(1989).
77. Garner, 471 U.S. at 7.
78. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 249 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(decrying substantive due process claims involving “unfairness”).
79. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.
80. Id.
81. See supra notes 24–32 and accompanying text.
82. See Ristroph, supra note 6, at 1189 (“The constitutional law of police force is not
indeterminate, but determinately permissive.”).
83. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
84. Id.
85. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983).
86. See Graham at 395; see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (discussing the
balancing test).
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Nevertheless, the Graham Court did not clearly articulate any individual
interests to consider.87 It noted three relevant factors which focused almost
exclusively on the government’s interest.88 Graham’s diabetes figured into
the Court’s factual summary, but not its analysis.89 If the Court had
apprehended that Graham had a right to be secure in his person, then his
health would factor into the analysis.90
Justice Scalia in Scott likewise failed to perform a serious balancing test.
He dismissed the question of whether the officer’s driving maneuver
constituted “deadly” force.91 Justice Scalia stated that Harris endangered
others by fleeing;92 perhaps he reasoned that Harris waived his Fourth
Amendment rights by engaging in reckless and dangerous conduct.93 But
nowhere did Justice Scalia note evidence at trial showing that Scott was not
trained in the maneuver he used on Harris.94 He also ignored that Scott
admitted the maneuver was wrongfully executed.95 Recognizing Harris’s
Fourth Amendment right to his limbs might have forced the Court to justify
this trial evidence.96 As it was, Justice Scalia did not identify any significant
counterweight to the government’s interest in arrest.
Taking language from the Garner dissent, Graham itself repudiated
Garner by emphasizing officers’ “split-second judgments.”97 Graham’s
attorneys initially saw the decision as a victory because it would move the
burden away from difficult-to-prove subjective tests.98 Instead, by offering
overly simplistic factors99 and limiting the role race can play in an excessive
force complaint,100 the shift to an objective standard yielded another
manipulable and preclusive standard.101 As a result, the Graham standard
did not improve, and might have worsened, the reality of racist police
violence.102
87. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (identifying three factors to determine reasonableness,
but not identifying the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests).
88. Id.
89. See Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 9, at 231.
90. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. An attorney for Graham later said that they
lost on remand. More Perfect, Mr. Graham and the Reasonable Man, WNYCSTUDIOS, at
28:24–29:50 (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/radiolabmoreperfect/
episodes/mr-graham-and-reasonable-man [https://perma.cc/J9ZF-6FER].
91. Scott, 550 U.S. at 381–83.
92. See id. at 384.
93. See id.
94. Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 9, at 234.
95. Id. at 235.
96. See supra notes 24–32 and accompanying text.
97. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 23 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also
Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 9, at 232.
98. See Lane, supra note 48.
99. See Harmon, supra note 42, at 1131.
100. See Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, The Futile Fourth Amendment:
Understanding Police Excessive Force Doctrine Through an Empirical Assessment of Graham
v. Connor, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1465, 1486 (2018) (finding a drop in federal court treatments
of race in police violence after Graham).
101. Id. at 1497 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment, as interpreted by Graham[ ]actually produces
racialized police violence . . . .”).
102. See id.; Lane, supra note 48.
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III. GUARANTEEING PERSONAL SECURITY
The Court’s retreat from Garner resembles the retreat from “personal
security.”103 In both areas, restrained justices retreated from reasoning which
appeared to “posit penumbras.”104 However, the Court’s recent revival of
personal security invites the revival of Garner.105 Thus, by drawing on the
original meaning of “personal security” and reframing Garner in this light,
reviewing courts can properly balance the Graham factors against the
individual’s personal security interests.
The original public meaning of the Fourth Amendment guarantees the
right of personal security from unreasonable arrest.106 But when nearly 26
percent of people killed by police are Black—while Black people make up
only about 13 percent of the national population107—there is a material
reason why Black families have “the talk.”108 Current jurisprudence on
excessive force allows police, regardless of any officer’s intent, to make
Black families fear for their lives in police encounters.109 Ultimately, the
question should be: what does it mean to be secure in one’s person from an
unreasonable seizure?110
Some critics may argue this definition of personal security—including life,
limb, body, health, and reputation111—is too sweeping. Further, they might
argue that the common law allowed the use of deadly force to effectuate
felony arrest, and because the Framers of the Fourth Amendment were
certainly aware of this practice, their omission is actually a commission of
the practice. But their interpretation of the Fourth Amendment cannot stand.
First, the requirement of “reasonableness” counterbalances the breadth of
personal security.112 Where the government’s interest in the arrest outweigh
the individual’s interest in personal security, the government prevails.113
Second, the Framers had no concept of massive, professionalized municipal
police forces armed with handguns such that the Framers could exclude
routine forcible arrest, sometimes by shooting, from the Constitution’s
protections.114 Indeed, the Fourth Amendment’s text broadly protects the
people from fear of unreasonable seizure.115 Read with the original public
103. Compare supra notes 65–70, 97–102 and accompanying text (describing the retreat
from Garner), with supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text (describing the retreat from
personal security).
104. Torres v. Madrid, No. 19-292, slip op. at 24 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2021) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
105. See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text.
107. Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 9, at 288.
108. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
110. Milligan, supra note 21, at 734–37.
111. See supra notes 24–32 and accompanying text.
112. Some scholars argue that “unreasonable” originally meant nonconformity to common
law. See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 21, at 1264.
113. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text.
114. See Torres v. Madrid, No. 19-292, slip op. at 8–9 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2021).
115. See supra notes 24–32 and accompanying text.
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meaning of “personal security” in mind,116 the Fourth Amendment text is the
elephant “before us,”117 sweepingly protecting life, limb, and reputation.118
Thus, reviewing courts should weigh Blackstone’s definition of personal
security against the government’s interest in arrest.119
Reading the Fourth Amendment to consider the right to personal security
in excessive force cases should not have unintended consequences in the
search context.120 Blackstone’s commentary on the right to personal security
demonstrates that the original public meaning of a right “to be secure” in
one’s person meant freedom from the fear of losing life and limb for failure
to comply with law enforcement.121 Threats to this right are virtually
inapplicable in the search context.122 Searches alone do not kill, maim, or
destroy reputations. Excessive force in arrest does.
Continuing to follow the Graham test without recognizing the role of the
right to personal security in the Fourth Amendment will continue the Court’s
permissive attitude toward police brutality.123 Ultimately, Justice Scalia
correctly determined that Garner was an application of Graham.124 Both
decisions focus on reasonableness,125 but each decision construes it
differently.126 In Graham and Scott, the Court failed to mention the
individual interest in personal security and created an imbalanced result.127
Courts should restore the balance of the interests by considering the right to
personal security in every excessive force case.128
Garner, however unartfully, alludes to the role personal security must play
in the analysis.129 When the Garner Court weighed Edward Garner’s
interests in life and due process, their decision can be understood within
116. See supra notes 24–32 and accompanying text.
117. Cf. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1753 (2020).
118. See supra notes 24–32 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 24–32 and accompanying text.
120. Within the search context, property rights receive much attention in originalist
discussions on the Fourth Amendment. See Donohue, supra note 21, at 1235–40 (analyzing
property and general warrants in England around the time of the Founding). Blackstone also
defined the right to property in his writings. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at *138.
121. Blackstone’s writings hint at the common law right to resist unlawful arrest. Compare
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *130 (noting that legal instruments are void when executed
under threat), with Ristroph, supra note 6, at 1190 (discussing common law right to resist
unlawful arrest).
122. Even considering “proprietary security” interests does not change the Fourth
Amendment beyond recognition. For a discussion of original Fourth Amendment meaning in
the context of property rights, see Davies, supra note 32, at 706–10.
123. See supra notes 7, 82 and accompanying text.
124. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007) (“Garner [applied the Graham test] to the
use of a particular type of force in a particular situation.”).
125. See supra notes 43, 55 and accompanying text.
126. Compare supra notes 73–82 and accompanying text, with supra notes 83–96 and
accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 83–96 and accompanying text.
128. This Essay argues only for clarifying, and affording adequate weight to, the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests when performing the balancing test to determine
reasonableness. Thus, the Graham standard itself would be unaltered. See supra notes 55–59,
83–86 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 73–82 and accompanying text.
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Blackstone’s definition of “personal security”130 in which life is an express
interest and “due process” implicates one’s “reputation.”131 Recognizing
these interests to lie within the Fourth Amendment was necessary but never
done in Graham or Scott.132 The Graham Court, for example, should have
balanced Dethorne Graham’s health against the need to arrest him.133
Similarly, the Scott Court should have balanced Victor Harris’s interest in
the use of his limbs against the need to stop him from speeding.134 Perhaps
this balancing test would not have changed the result in these cases.135 But
this test would force reviewing courts to do more than rubber-stamp police
conduct.
Justice Scalia rightly blurred the lines between deadly force and other
types of force.136 Because police organize force along a continuum,137 all
excessive force cases evoke the right to personal security.138 Imagining a
situation where another Dethorne Graham dies at the hands of another Officer
Connor is not difficult; people with disabilities frequently die at the hands of
police.139 Further, an exceedingly permissive constitutional standard of
review for excessive force means that compliance with police orders will not
always guarantee a person’s safety.140

130. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Scrutiny of police brutality frequently leads
to media attention on the wrongs a victim of police brutality committed in their life. See
Melissa Pandika, Elijah McClain and the Pitfalls of the “Perfect Victim” Narrative, MIC (July
16, 2020), https://www.mic.com/p/elijah-mcclain-the-pitfalls-of-the-perfect-victim-narrative29135795 [https://perma.cc/4GQ2-3KVF].
132. See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 91–96 and accompanying text.
135. In particular, the danger Victor Harris posed to other road users may still have
outweighed his personal security interest, especially considering Justice Scalia’s waiver
approach. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. However, reckless driving is not a
felony in Georgia. GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-390 (2021). Thus, under the common law rule,
officers would lack authority to use deadly force to effectuate his arrest. See Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985) (noting that using deadly force in apprehending a misdemeanant
was illegal under common law).
136. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
139. For example, in 2018, New York Police Department officers killed Saheed Vassell, a
man who needed treatment for bipolar disorder. Laura Dimon et al., NYPD Cops Fatally Shoot
Bipolar Black Man Holding Metal Pipe Police Mistake for Gun on Brooklyn Street, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (Apr. 5, 2018, 3:21 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/newyork/brooklyn/nypd-cops-shoot-kill-bipolar-black-man-metal-pipe-nyc-article-1.3914960
[https://perma.cc/36E2-JDEC].
140. One police officer shot a Black mental health worker who had complied with police
orders. Charles Rabin, Cop Shoots Caretaker of Autistic Man Playing in the Street with Toy
Truck, MIA. HERALD (July 21, 2016, 8:39 AM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/
crime/article90905442.html [https://perma.cc/NP8U-374B]. The officer’s statement noted
that he acted “in a split second,” which echoes the language of Graham. See Erik Ortiz, North
Miami Cop Who Shot Unarmed Man Charles Kinsey: ‘I Did What I Had to Do’, NBC NEWS
(July 22, 2016, 2:37 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/north-miami-cop-whoshot-unarmed-man-charles-kinsey-i-n614766 [https://perma.cc/4PD9-G5MT]; see also supra
note 57 and accompanying text.
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When police pepper-sprayed a nine-year-old Black girl, was it
constitutional?141 There should be little doubt it was not. Yet in the United
States in 2021, police can seriously injure and kill citizens, disproportionately
people of color, without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment. Justice
Scalia may have meant to exclude process and punishment concerns when
stating that the balancing test involves only interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment.142 But both rights relate to the security of one’s person. The
current standard allows police in the United States to kill or maim people
who may be unarmed and innocent in a “split-second judgment,”143 whereas
courts over the last forty-five years have sentenced to death many fewer
people found guilty of gravely serious crimes.144 This result is absurd; in
cases reaching trial and sentencing, the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments will afford greater personal security than the amendment which
expressly affords that right. In cases where police exceed their force
authorizations, these amendments can be read as surplusage. Even the first
clause of the Fourth Amendment is surplus when it is so rarely invoked to
protect individual rights.
Graham has been applied as a minimum justification standard.145
Accordingly, the Graham standard recommends a scheme for justifying
unreasonable and intolerable police violence.146 This application cannot
stand. It fails to consider properly the meaning of the Fourth Amendment’s
text.147 Courts should revitalize the reasoning in Garner to formulate a
serious balancing test between the individual’s interest in personal security
and any governmental interest in effectuating an arrest. The Fourth
Amendment demands an aspiration to end the need for “the talk.”148
CONCLUSION
Courts must correct the constitutional controls on police use of force. To
do so, they should emphasize the textual “personal security” interest recently
revived at the Supreme Court. Reviewing courts should incorporate this
interest into the Graham balancing test to determine reasonableness. Garner
properly weighs the individual’s interest in their personal security as interests
in their life, limbs, health, and reputation, ensuring that courts may
incorporate personal security interests without disrupting precedent.

141. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. But see Torres v. Madrid, No. 19-292,
slip op. at 9–10 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2021) (declining to determine whether pepper spraying a
suspect who eludes capture constitutes a Fourth Amendment “seizure”).
142. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007).
143. See supra notes 57, 97 and accompanying text.
144. Compare Bialik, supra note 8, with Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR. (Mar. 24, 2021) https://documents.deathpenaltyinfo.org/pdf/FactSheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NR5K-CFQB] (counting 1532 total executions at the state and federal levels
since 1976).
145. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 24–32 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.

